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1 
I. Introduction 
 
On August 5th, 2009 a remotely controlled, unmanned plane, otherwise known as a Predator 
drone is able to capture images of the most wanted man in Pakistan; Baitullah Meshud.1 With the 
capability of the Predator drone, the Central Intelligence Agency, located in Langley, Virginia 
watches live footage of Meshud relaxing and receiving medical treatment at his father in-laws 
house located in Pakistan. 2  Accompanying Meshud were family members, body guards and 
bystanders.3 Pakistan Prime Interior Minister A. Rehman Malik explained that the images obtained 
by the CIA was a perfect picture of Meshud’s entire body not just the top of his head.4 The real 
time picture remained stable as the CIA remotely launched two Hellfire missiles from the Predator 
drone; after the dust had settled all that remained of the most wanted man in Pakistan was his 
detached torso.5 Eleven others perished as well; including his wife, father-in-law, his mother-in-
law, a lieutenant, and seven bodyguards.6 To U.S. officials, the killing of Meshud was a crucial 
tactical victory in the fight against terrorist organizations such as the Taliban and al Qaeda.7 
Meshud was the number one most wanted man in Pakistan because  he was suspected in the 
assassination of Pakistan’s former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, as well as the suicide truck 
bombing of the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad; resulting in 50 causalities.8 Meshud was also involved 
in helping the Afghan confederates attack American coalition troops.9 The successful airstrike in  
                                                     
1 Jane Mayer, The Predator War, New Yorker (Oct. 26, 2009), available at 
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Pakistan is not a one-time event for the United States. It is an example of targeted killing—
something that is necessary in the war on terrorism.  
A week after the attacks on September 11, President George W. Bush authorized a secret 
order, which remains classified, that authorized the CIA to seek to kill or capture the leaders of al 
Qaeda and other allied terror organizations. 10  The executive order, authorized by Bush, was 
required by law to be in writing with copies sent to the House and Senate intelligence committees 
including a list of the leading al Qaeda figures to be targeted.11 Since 2004 the Unites States has 
used drones to evaluate intelligence and vetted individuals for attack in the middle east. 12 
According to data gathered by the Long War Journal, the number of drone-based strikes from 
2004-2007 was in the single digits.13 However, in years 2008-2010, those numbers soared to 35, 
53, and 117 in those respective years.14 Although that number has fallen to 64 strikes in 2011, 
following the killing of Osama bin Laden, these strikes are an integral part of the United States 
strategy in destroying terror organizations.15 Since the implementation of Bush’s secret executive 
order, targeted killing has become America’s most effective tool in fighting terror organizations 
and according to CIA Director Leon Panetta the program was “the only game in town”.16 
While America has been successful in fighting terror groups using targeted killing, there 
have been opponents to the use of this strategy. Opponents of targeted killing protest that this 
practice may violate international human rights laws, laws of war, violates U.S. law banning 
assassinations, and even if these practices were legal it would be unwise because they risk 
                                                     
10 John Yoo, Assassination or Targeted Killings After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 57, 59 (2011/2012). 
11 Id. at 59-60.  
12 Harwood, Supra at 4.  
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retaliations against Americans.17  While these concerns are not completely meritless, we will 
discuss and analyze further in the paper why targeted killing is a legal, just, and effective tool 
used by the United States because of the current landscape, necessity to keep US citizens safe, 
and up to date technology used during war. Although targeted killing is a useful and reliable 
tactic that the US relies on; it needs to be used carefully and the law needs to be refined 
internationally.  
First, this paper will discuss specific events where the United States used targeted killing 
post 9/11; the good and the bad. Then, we will discuss the policy and procedure used in 
determining whether to execute these targeted killings along with the benefits and the hazards of 
targeted killings. Next, we will discuss the war paradigm and the proper legal framework. During 
this section we will discuss the right to self-defense, different forms of self-defense and why 
targeted killing is not assassination.  
II. Targeted Killing by the United States after 9/11 
In this section, we will primarily focus on specific accounts of targeted killing by the United 
States. The United States’ targeted killing program has produced desired outcomes. However, 
there have be occasions where innocent lives have been lost while conducting this practice. This 
section will discuss different terror operatives and the circumstances surrounding their targeted 
killings. As noted the United States targeted killing program has been largely successful, however 
this section will further discuss instances where the United States’ targeted killing program has 
had shortcomings. 
a. Mullah Mohammed Omar 
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In October 2001, a 27-foot drone called the predator was deployed over southern 
Afghanistan and had appeared to spot Mullah Mohammed Omar (leader of the Taliban) in a 
convoy of cars fleeing Kabul.18 Following protocol and agreement with the military commanders, 
the CIA sought approval from the United States Central Command to launch a hellfire missile at 
Omar, who at that time had already sought cover and was in a building with about 100 guards.19 
Apparently General Tommy Lee Franks declined approval because of advice from his military 
lawyer.20 This because the building that was believed to contain Omar was believed to be a Mosque; 
which under the rules of engagement would make it a target to avoid.21 However, other reports 
claim that he sought approval from the President, who personally approved the strike, but the delay 
allowed Omar to escape.22 With a steadfast international law or protocol when conducting a drone 
strike, the United States would have been able to take out a high ranking Taliban official. Because 
of the confusion and delay, Omar was able to escape and continue to lead the Taliban, resulting in 
a failure for the United States. 
b. Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi 
On November 3, 2002, al-Harethi, al Qaeda’s top operative in Yemen and a key planner in 
the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, which killed 17 U.S. sailors, was spotted using a Predator 
drone in Marib Province, Yemen, with five other suspected al Qaeda members.23 Controlling the 
drone from a remote area, a CIA pilot fired a Hellfire missile from the drone and directly connected 
with the target, killing all six members in the car.24 DNA samples later confirmed the Predator 
                                                     
18 Dycus, Supra at 418. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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missile attack had in fact taken out the al-Harethi, the intended target.25 Also identified in wake of 
the hell fire missile attack was Kamal Derwish, a U.S. citizen who grew up near Buffalo and was 
reportedly the leader of an al Qaeda sleeper cell known as “Lackawanna 6” and helped recruit 
American Muslims for training in al Qaeda camps.26 Other members of Derwish’s cell had been 
arrested in 2003 for providing material support to terrorists.27  The members arrested plead guilty 
and are serving a sentence of seven to ten years in prison.28 Derwish was not afforded the benefit 
of an arrest warrant, lawyers, and prosecution because he escaped the reach of the FBI and was 
found in reach of a CIA missile, resulting in a casualty during the pursuit of top al Qaeda 
operative.29 During his presidency, President Obama stated that it would be unconstitutional for 
the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen without due process, however, when a U.S. 
citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens; his 
citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd of 
people should be protected from a swat team.30 Thus the killing of al-Harethi and Derwish should 
be considered  successes because it prevented future terror plots. 
c. Osama Bin Laden pursuit  
The United States used drones in the war with Iraq, but the pace and frequency at which 
the US used drones as well as the geographic expanse of their deployment widened after President 
Bush had received intelligence; revisions by President Obama in 2009 and 2010 authorized 
targeting Osama bin Laden as well as other top ranking terror operatives.31 According to White 
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House counterterrorism adviser John O. Brennan, rather than use “the hammer” the United States 
would use “the scalpel” to seek out terror targets.32  
Although the United States has had many success stories involving drone strikes and 
targeted killings; there have been pitfalls. In February 2002, a United States Predator drone spotted 
a very tall man being greeted gushingly by villagers.33 Because Osama bin Laden was said to be 
approximately six feet five inches tall, the order was quickly given to strike.34 By the time the 
order was given the group had scattered, but the drone captured another imagine of a tall man and 
two others emerging from a wooded area.35 The drone was quickly launched killing all three men 
who happened to be locals scavenging for wood instead of bin Laden; the intended target.36  
After months of gathering intelligence regarding the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden, on 
May 1st 2011, American special force personnel in helicopters descended into a walled compound 
in Pakistan.37 After nearly a forty-minute-long fire fight Osama bin Laden had been shot in the 
head and killed.38 President Obama decided to use a commando raid as opposed to a drone strike 
to avoid collateral damage that would occur in a residential area and to also verify bin Laden’s 
identity once he was captured or killed.39 Once bin Laden was located by Navy SEALs at the top 
floor of the compound, he was reported to have resisted arrest, which resulted in his fatality even 
though he was unarmed. 40  Several other people were also killed during the raid, but others 
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including one of bin Laden’s wives, were uninjured during the ordeal.41 Outside the compound 
was also unaffected.42 
d. Other Al Qaeda Operative Targets  
On May 25, 2010, the United States launched a drone strike into remote Marib Province in 
Yemen.43 The strike was aimed to target a small group of al Qaeda operatives that had been 
meeting in the remote area.44 The missile was successful in hitting the intended targets, however 
the drone strike had also killed the Deputy Governor of Marib Province, who unbeknownst to the 
United States, was meeting with al Qaeda to convince them to put down their arms (according to 
Yemen Government sources).45  
As noted by the previous scenarios, the United States targeted killing program has largely 
been a success.  However, it has its drawbacks in which the procedure should be refined to become 
more efficient. The refining of the United States policy will allow the U.S. to minimize failures in 
the future. Although this paper suggests the United States policy needs refining, this does not mean 
the targeted killing program, to date, is ineffective, unjust, or illegal. Simply, to become more 
effective, this tool needs to be revised. In the following section this paper will discuss and analyze 
United States policy on targeted killings. 
III. Policy  
In response to the horrific events that took place on 9/11 congress passed the Authorization 
of Use Military Force (AUMF); authorizing the use of lethal force against al Qaeda.46 The AUMF 
did not put a geographic or temporal limitation on the use of force; only stating that the president 
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may use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 
2001.47 Since being inaugurated, the Obama administration has used a broad interpretation of the 
AUMF; not only limiting the use of force to just al Qaeda and the Taliban but expanding to use of 
force against any organization or persons the administration views as “associate forces” of al 
Qaeda even if those groups or individuals had no hand in planning the 9/11 attacks.48  
Since implementing and expanding the AUMF, Obama’s administration has faced 
questions of legality for continued use of drones that are targeted to kill terrorist.49 In response, the 
State Department Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, addressed the American Society of International 
Law (ASIL).50 During the address, Koh defended the United States targeted drone killings and 
stated, “It is the considered view of this Administration… that US targeting practices, including 
lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable 
law, including the laws of war”.51 Specifically Koh cites the United States compliance under 
domestic law,  the AUMF, and international law as proof that the united states has engaged in 
armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and “associate forces”. 52  When performed in 
accordance with the laws of war, targeted killings are not only a vital tool for the United States, 
but also a justified tool in fighting against terror organizations. In conducting targeted killings, the 
United States acts consistent with the principals of “distinction” and “proportionality” to warrant 
that the targeted are legitimate and minimize the collateral damage that may be a result.53 
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In his Speech, Koh list four main reasons why targeted drone killings are legal. First, in 
response to suggestions that the very act of targeting a particular leader of an enemy force in an 
armed conflict must violate the laws of war, Koh states, “individuals who are part of such an armed 
group are belligerents and, therefore, lawful targets under international law”. 54  Koh asserts, 
“targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus when force is employed and to avoid 
broader harm to civilians and civilian objects”.55 Second, in response to challenges that the very 
use of advanced weapons, including drone strikes in lethal attacks is illegal, Koh states that as long 
as their use conforms to the laws of war that the use of drones is legal.56 Essentially the rules 
governing targeting does not turn on the type of instrument used, and there is no prohibition under 
the laws of war to use technologically advanced weapons during armed conflict.57 Third, there has 
been an ongoing argument that the use of lethal forces against specific individuals fails to provided 
adequate due process and is thus an unlawful extrajudicial killing. 58  Koh retorts that a state 
engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide enemy 
combatants or targets with legal process before using lethal force.59 Furthermore, the United States 
targets are selected through a “robust” procedure and advanced technologies have helped make 
strikes extremely precise.60 Finally, Koh contends that using drones to target high level belligerent 
enemy combatants/leaders does not violate domestic law banning assassinations because during a 
time of armed conflict or acting in self-defense targeting these belligerent officials is not unlawful 
                                                     
54 Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State. Adress at the Annual meeting of the American Society of 
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55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
 
10 
and thus does not constitute “assassination” as long as it is consistent with the applicable laws of 
war.61  
In 2013, President Obama and senior members of the executive branch briefed to congress, 
written policy and procedures that formalize and strengthen the Administration’s rigorous process 
for reviewing and approving operations of capture or whether to use lethal force against terror 
operatives outside of the United States as well as outside of areas of active hostilities.62 The written 
policy provided that United States Policy is not to use lethal force when feasible to capture the 
intended target.63 If it is possible to capture the intended target it would provide the US with an 
opportunity to receive intelligence regarding terror activity and would provide the US with the 
ability to disrupt possible plots of terror. Capture operations are only conducted against suspects 
who may lawfully be captured and detained by the US and only when capture can be conducted in 
accordance with applicable law and obligations with other sovereign states.64 It is the view of the 
Administration that lethal force is not to be used in lieu of prosecution of a terrorist.65 Lethal force 
is a tool used to prevent or stop attacks against U.S. persons,  and even then, lethal force will only 
be used when capture is not feasible and no other reasonable alternative exists to address the 
threat.66 
The situations described by Koh take place while the United States is at war or during 
armed conflict. During peacetime conditions, the United States would not consider acting 
preemptively in an attempt to kill an individual before they had actually committed a crime. During 
Peacetime conditions protocol would be to act retrospectively; meaning a suspect must commit a 
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crime which would then be followed by being arrested or detained by law enforcement; deadly 
force may only be used to save the lives of people at danger during the crime committed.67 
However, in times of war the US must act prospectively. Because of the concern that war 
brings this is a necessity. When at war, a nation seeks to defeat its enemy to prevent future harms 
and attacks on its own citizens by opposing forces.68 To prevent these potential harms and attacks 
the United States must rely less on exact information and more on probabilities and predictions.69 
Put more simply, the United States makes informed decisions on when to strike in times of war to 
keep society safe from future attack. During wartime, the military often attempts to destroy a 
building in which it believes, with high certainty, to contain enemy munitions or enemy soldiers.70 
It would be ill advised to wait until it has proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even to a lesser 
standard, probable cause because that would risk allowing the enemy to escape or to live another 
day to attack and cause harm to American civilians.71 In either event it gives the opposition an 
upper hand against the United States.  
Let’s take the Kamal Derwish situation into account for both peacetime conditions and 
during war time. What we know about Kamal Derwish is that he is a U.S. citizen who grew up 
near Buffalo and was reportedly the leader of an al Qaeda sleeper cell known as “Lackawanna 6” 
as well as helped recruit American Muslims for training in al Qaeda camps.72 In 2002, Derwish 
was present, with other al Qaeda operatives whom all died when struck by a drone set off by the 
CIA director.73 If during a time of peace, the United States had suspected Derwish of conspiring 
to commit terrorist acts, the United states would have to gather enough evidence to show probable 
                                                     
67 Yoo, Supra at 63. 
68 Yoo, Supra at 64. 
69 Id. 
70Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Yoo, Supra at 58.  
73 Yoo, Supra at 60.  
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cause to arrest him.74 The American Justice system would require a trial and then only if the jury 
sentenced Derwish to death could he be executed.75 However, because the United States was at 
war with Al Qaeda and “associated forces”, the AUMF governs and authorizes the lethal force 
against; making the death of Derwish not only just but legal as well.76 According to John Yoo, 
because the United States is at war with al Qaeda, it is entitled to kill and eliminate opposing 
commanders.77 This does not give the United States a license to kill anyone suspected of being a 
terror operative. There are limits to the use of targeted killing. In agreeance with Yoo, under the 
rules of war, soldiers are limited and must obey the principles of necessity, discrimination, 
proportionality, and imminence.78  
 Beyond the aims of the US is the fact that the war on terror is a new kind of war. Historically 
the United States has been able to win using conventional warfare tactics. These tactics include 
invading the enemy location, destroying opposing forces on the battlefield, and capturing key cities 
geographically. 79  Because of the large population and mass production, resulting in a well-
equipped and well-armed military, the US generally decimates and over-powers the opposing force 
resulting in being victorious. This type of warfare will not work with the war on terrorism. The 
United States can’t just out produce and out-man the opposing terror forces and expect to win. 
This is partially because the Taliban and Afghanistan insurgents take advantage of the porous 
border and difficult terrain. 80  Furthermore, because terrorist networks have no territory or 
uniformed armed forces to over-power, traditional warfare will remain largely ineffective.81 The 
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problem does not lie within the amount of strength and power of the United States but mainly with 
where and whom to aim it at.82 Terror organizations do not practice prototypical warfare and mass 
their operations on a battlefield. Instead they hide amongst the general population or in remote 
geographical locations; which are out of reach of the United States ground forces.83  
 To help overcome the obstacles in this new warfare the United States has implemented the 
use of drones to help fight the opponent. The use of this form of combat is a desirable and attractive 
one for military and counterterrorism operations for several reasons.84 First is that drones have the 
ability to loiter over a specific area for extended periods of time; which allows them to collect and 
capture information and allow personnel to make decisions quickly based on the information.85 
Second, is that in military application the drones can provide precise information collection that 
facilitates accurate targeting as well as battlefield and non-battlefield surveillance.86 Third, is that 
drones prove a wider range of operational reach; meaning that were manned operations cannot 
reach, drones are able to.87 Fourth, is that drones allow military to have presence in areas that 
would otherwise be impossible politically, capacity/resource prohibitive, and too dangerous for 
manned operations.88 Finally , the drone provides the military with the ability to act stealthy.89 
While the drone may be able to be detected by sophisticated air defense systems, most drones are 
relatively small, quiet, and capable of flying at high altitudes to avoid detection by opposing forces 
being targeted.90 
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 Often, opponents of targeted killings programs thrust the idea of national sovereignty and 
international laws into the forefront of the argument. The question presented is, “why can’t other 
nations take the necessary and appropriate action in order stop and detain terror operatives inside 
their own country”? Here the answer is quite simple; the country is either unwilling or unable to 
do so. A country that is unable might be where the sovereign state lacks functional control over 
those parts of its territory where military force is being used.91 A country that is unwilling on the 
other hand might be opposed to the capture or detaining of an operative if said operative has helped 
the sovereign state in the past and has relations with state. For example, although Yemeni officials 
had apparently cooperated in the targeted killing of al-Harethi, they had previously failed in 
apprehending him and may have been reluctant to do so because of a perceived debt owed to bin 
Laden, who had assisted the Yemeni president in putting down a separatist movement in 1994.92 
U.S. policy and standards are emphatic that the United States respects national sovereignty and 
international law.93 In 2012, then Attorney General Holder emphasized that “the use of force in a 
foreign territory would be consistent with these international law principles if conducted, for 
example,… after a determination that the nation is unwilling  or unable to deal effectively with a 
threat to the United States”.94 
 Outside areas of hostilities, lethal force may only be used when a set of preconditions have 
been met.95 The first criteria that must be met is there must be a legal basis for using lethal force, 
regardless if it is a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or just the forces that 
organization is using.96  Second, the US will only use lethal force against a target when the threat 
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the target poses against a U.S. person is continuing and imminent.97 If a terrorist does not pose 
such a threat the US will pursue a different avenue.98 Third, the Administration listed criteria that 
must be met before lethal action may be taken: (1) near certainty that the terrorist target is present; 
(2) near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; (3) An assessment that capture 
is not feasible at the time of operation; (4) An assessment that the relevant governmental authorities 
in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. 
persons; and (5) an assessment that no other reasonable alternative exists to effectively address the 
threat to U.S. persons. 99  Lastly whenever the US uses lethal force in foreign territories, 
international legal principles, as well as that sovereign states laws, and the laws of armed conflict 
will apply.100 The United States is unable to act unilaterally.101 
 The decision to use lethal force as opposed to capture is made at the most senior levels of 
the United States Government.102 The senior officials receive information and intelligence from 
other departments and agencies with relevant expertise that allow them to make informed 
decisions.103 These informed decisions will be informed by a broad analysis of an intended targets 
current and past role in plots that threaten U.S. persons; relevant intelligence information the 
individual could provide; and the potential impact of the operation of ongoing terrorism plotting, 
capabilities of the terrorist organization, and on U.S. intelligence collection.104 Not only does an 
analysis need to pass the policy standards; the analysis needs to pass legal analysis as well. 
a. Benefits and Hazards of Targeted Killings 
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i. Hazards of Targeted Killings 
Even if the United States is legally justified in using lethal force against enemy combatants 
it still has its strategic costs and hazards. While eliminating leaders of the enemy may sound like 
a great, idea the downside is that it causes what is known as the hydra effect. The hydra effect is 
the rise of more and more resolute leaders to replace them. 105  Taking out the leader of the 
organization may also cause retaliation from the enemy forces.106 If the terror group retaliates then 
the US will continue their path and use of targeted killing against the enemy, meaning that there 
will be no real end in sight and the behavior of both sides will continue. Furthermore the fallen 
leader may be viewed as a martyr for the cause.107 For example, when Israel assassinated Abbas 
Mussawi, Hezbollah’s leader in Lebanon, in 1992, the group retaliated with two strikes that blew 
up Israeli and Jewish targeted in Buenos Aires, in the name of their fallen leader.108 This attack 
was led by new charismatic leader Hassan Nassrallah.109 Targeted Killing may also interfere with 
the gathering of new information and critical intelligence because if they are unable to be captured 
and instead killed, the US loses out on a chance to interrogate the target.110 Targets are also 
generally aware that they are targets which thrusts them into hiding, making it difficult for the US 
to track them.111 Although, this can be spun into a positive because it  may change the behavior of 
the terror group, which may impede the enemy group’s ability to communicate, which results in 
confusion and the disarray of enemy forces.112 Another negative to targeted killings is that it may 
strengthen the sense of legitimacy of the terrorist operation because it is viewed as the only possible 
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option when up against an empire.113 When the United states carries out a drone strike or any form 
of lethal killing that goes wrong, resulting in civilian causalities, it is possible that the United States 
has just helped in recruitment and further radicalization. In similar situations, targeted killings may 
cause a strain on diplomatic relations between the US and the sovereign state in which they are 
conducting the strike.114 For example, when the US launched a drone strike into remote Marib 
Province in Yemen.115 The strike was aimed to target a small group of al Qaeda operatives that 
had been meeting in the remote area.116 The missile was successful in hitting the intended targets, 
however, the drone strike had also killed the Deputy Governor of Marib Province, who 
unbeknownst to the US, was meeting with al Qaeda to convince them to put down their arms 
(according to Yemen Government sources). 117  This scenario could foster and strain the US 
diplomatic relations with Yemen as well as other countries.  
The United States needs to be cautious in the over use of targeted killing. The over use of 
targeted killing tactics may lead to desensitization of the matter, which in turn, could lead to the 
over stepping of legal boundaries set forth below. Although extraordinary interrogation tactics are 
per se illegal under IHL and targeted killing is not, a similarity can be drawn that the over use of 
targeting killing may lead to desensitization; resulting in the illegal use, the same way 
extraordinary interrogation tactics developed.118 Technology has been advanced to the point that 
the US can kill from remote areas on the other side of the world. Philip Alston, the United Nations 
special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions criticize what is coined as the 
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“PlayStation mentality” that technology has created. 119  Alston cautions that, “young military 
personnel raised on a healthy diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. 
Far removed from human consequences of their actions, how will this generation of fighters value 
the right to life?”120 Further danger arises as the killing of a terrorist may be viewed as a simpler 
operation than lengthy legal battles over detention, trial, extradition, and release.121  
Another concern and criticism of the targeted killing program is that the availability of 
lethal UAV technologies has tempted the United States to engage in a largely covert campaign, 
which has created a “secret war” governed by “secret law”.122 This criticism centers around the 
use of lethal force against targets located outside of traditional battlefields.123 Furthermore, the 
lack of transparency and accountability the US has when conducting targeted killing has been 
scrutinized because critics view potential implications for domestic and international rule of law; 
especially if other nations follow precedents set by the US.124 The Stimson Report notes that states 
that may mimic US precedent may include many who are not known for their human rights 
record.125  
ii. Benefits of Targeted Killing  
Although there are risks in conducting targeted killing, the benefits far outweigh the costs. 
At the most basic level, conducting targeted killing provides the US with less risk than if 
attempting to apprehend the target; and has proved to be effective.126 The effectiveness has been 
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asserted by President Obama after the United States had a successful strike against bin Laden. 
Obama stated that:  
the intelligence gathered at bin Laden’s compound, we found what he wrote, “we 
could lose the reserves to the enemy’s air strikes. We cannot fight airstrikes with 
explosives.” Other communications from al Qaeda operatives confirm this as well. 
Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb makers, and 
operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted that would 
have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities and our 
troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.127 
 
As stated above, the use of targeted killing of leaders of a terrorist group can change the groups 
organization behavior.128  A change in group behavior caused by hiding out of fear of being 
targeted can cause organizational confusion and disarray.129 The more time group leaders spend 
hiding, the less time they can spend developing terror plans against the US and the harder it 
becomes for them to relay these plans.130 This may also cause paranoia amongst group members 
which interferes with communications.131 Furthermore organizational leaders may spend more of 
their time protecting themselves instead of concocting terror plots.132 According to reports, the 
killing of leaders of Palestinian armed groups weakened the will and ability of the group to execute 
suicide attacks against Israelis.133 The Obama administration has used targeted killing not only 
because it has been effective, but because it has allowed them to reach areas and borders that would 
otherwise but unable to be reached in porous terrains by soldiers on foot.134 It also adds a level of 
protection for the troops. Finally, targeted killing gives the public perception that the United States 
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will not just stand by and allow terrorist to strike fear and cause harm to civilians. For the reasons 
stated, the benefits far outweigh the costs. 
IV. Legality of Targeted Killing 
 The debate today is over whether the use of targeted killing is lawful and which law governs 
this action. Courts have generally remained silent on this subject; however, this has not stopped 
the US from implementing these tactics. In this section, we will apply several operations that the 
US has conducted and which legal paradigm it should be analyzed under. We will discuss the 
paradigm of international human rights law (IHR) as well as the paradigm of international 
humanitarian law (IHL). We will also discuss the executive ban on “assassination”.  
 Human Rights Law is international law that restricts governments in their treatment of 
civilians during peacetime conditions.135 IHR requires some sort of judicial procedure and the right 
of due process before anyone is executed, thus avoiding the concern of extrajudicial killing.136 The 
United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
provides in Article 9 that, “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly 
unavoidable in order to protect life”.137 Article 10 further provides that: 
“Law enforcement officials shall identify themselves as such and shall give a clear 
warning of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warnings to be 
observed, unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement officials at risk 
or would create a risk of death or serious harm to other persons, or would be clearly 
inappropriate or pointless in circumstances of the incident.”138 
 
Essentially the imminence of the threat provides the evidence to justify the use of lethal force, 
removing the need to prove intentions of the target.139 IHR requires a strict threat of imminence 
                                                     
135 Dycus, Supra at 420. 
136 Id. 
137 Dycus, Supra at 421. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
 
21 
and necessity through unavailability of other means.140 As stated previously the predicate for 
extrajudicial killing of someone outside an area of armed conflict is that the killing would defend 
innocent person from unlawful violence and harm that is imminent. 141  The Human Rights 
Committee notes that before resorting to lethal force, that every measure to arrest a terror suspect 
must be exhausted.142 The committee adds that an operation to use targeted killing must never be 
used as a form of retribution or revenge; the nation’s operation will only be legitimate if its goal 
is preemption.143 
 Under IHR, proponents view the killing of al-Harethi and Derwish as a clear case of 
extrajudicial killing.144 The Swedish foreign minister called the attacks, “a summary execution that 
violates human rights. Terrorist must be treated according to international law. Otherwise any 
country can start executing those whom they consider terrorist”.145 The European view is that IHR 
always applies, even alongside IHL on the battle field.146 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and other International Courts have generally applied IHR during arm-conflict.147 However, the 
United States position is that as a lex specialis IHL exclusively occupies the field of regulation 
during armed conflict.148  
The US addressed the legal standard it believes to apply during armed conflict against al 
Qaeda in a letter to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.149 In this letter the 
US stated that it is engaged in a continuing armed conflict with al Qaeda and that the law of war 
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applies to the conduct of war.150 IHR advocates believe that IHR principles should be applied to 
determine whether the targeted killing program constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life.151 In an 
advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, the ICJ held that during an armed conflict, 
the standard for judging whether an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life has occurred is rooted 
in IHL.152 As noted in Major John C. Harwood’s article, the rationale applied by the ICJ is 
applicable to a targeted killing program as it is to the use of nuclear weapons because when 
determining whether the use of a particular weapon system is lawful during armed conflict, IHL 
is the correct source of law in which to analyze.153 IHL provides guidelines on the means and 
methods of warfare, the status and treatment of civilians, and the treatment of cultural property.154 
Thus, when there is a conflict that arises between IHR and IHL on the battlefield, IHL is a lex 
specialis of armed conflict and preempts IHR in the eyes of the United States.  
 IHL governs the use of force lethal force in armed conflicts.155 Proponents of IHL claim 
that IHR is, and has traditionally been, understood as applying to State’s actions within its own 
territory.156 According to W. Jason Fisher, the US maintains that IHR is not operative because 
targeted killings take place outside  state borders.157 Advocates for IHL contend that the hostilities 
that are brought forth by terrorist and terror groups, such as al Qaeda, meet the definition of armed 
conflict. The US maintains that targeted killing should be evaluated in accordance with 
international armed conflict.158 This even though hostilities between the US and terror groups are 
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between a state and a non-state actor. Proponents of applying the international armed conflict 
framework to targeted killing insist that humanitarian concerns and transnational nature of 
hostilities warrant application.159 The core principle for international armed conflict centers around 
the distinction between “combatant” and “civilian”.160  Combatants are subject to attacks and 
civilians are not. A combatant has certain criteria: (1) a member of the regular armed forces of a 
belligerent party; (2) a member of militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
(a)to be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) to have a fixed distinctive 
emblem recognizable at a distance; (c) to carry arms openly; (d) to conduct operations in 
accordance with laws and customs of war; and (e) to be linked to a party to the conflict; (3) an 
inhabitant of a non-occupied territory who, on approach of the enemy, spontaneously takes up 
arms to resist invading troops.161 A majority of international scholars who evaluate targeted killing 
under the rules of international armed conflict agree that the terrorists the US seeks to eliminate 
do not qualify as combatants.162 The legality of this principle instead rests on whether terrorist, as 
civilians, are taking part in active hostilities.163 According to the Geneva Conventions Article 51(3) 
civilians shall enjoy protection unless they take part in hostilities.164  
 The principles behind non-international armed conflict more accurately describe the 
ongoing situation between the US and terror organizations. Like the use of the rules in international 
armed conflict; in non-international armed conflict to determine the legality of targeted killings a 
distinction between combatants and civilians must be made.165 Non-international armed conflict is 
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a conflict between the armed forces of a state and “organized and armed groups.166 Proponents of 
this view maintain that terror organizations such as al Qaeda, Taliban, or any jihadist extremist 
group qualify as an organized and armed group and their members may be targeted with lethal 
force as combatants.167 Individuals who do not take part in these armed groups referenced will be 
considered civilians and are not subject to targeted lethal force. It is the view of supporters of IHR 
and international armed conflict IHL that non-international armed conflict would give countries 
using it, such as the US, too much leeway in determining and targeting terror suspects.168 
 The legality of the rules of international armed conflict and legality of targeted killing turns 
on which interpretation, narrow or broad, to adopt. The narrow interpretation limits the US to only 
conducting targeted killings to civilians who are actively engaging in hostilities. This means a 
terrorist engaged in fighting, attempting to attack, or terrorist who are concealing weapons on their 
body are subject to targeted killing.169 However, under this interpretation a terrorist may not be 
targeted in planning or preparation of an attack; in this case they are only subject to arrest and 
detainment. 170  Under the broad interpretation of the civilian targeting exception, hostilities 
between the US and terrorists are prolonged and terrorist tend to be repeat offenders.171 If a civilian 
terrorist is allowed to alternate between protected and unprotected civilian status it would render 
right of self-defense of the US useless and would create a revolving door of terrorists alternating 
from active to inactive civilian terrorist.172 A risk associated with the US application of IHL under 
non-international armed conflict is that it would erode the level of protection usually afforded to 
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civilians and would grant the US to much leeway in determining terror suspects.173 Although there 
are risks, the strongest argument for the US application of IHL in targeted killing would be 
according to the rules of non-international armed conflict.  
 Regardless if targeted killing is in accordance with international or non-international armed 
conflict it must also be in accordance with the proportionality standard to be deemed legal under 
the IHL analysis. 174  This rule is expressed in the Geneva Conventions Article 51(5)(b) of 
Additional Protocol, in which it states that an action is disproportionate if it may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage of civilian objects, or anything that 
would be considered excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.175 Opponents of the IHL framework believe that targeted killing is presumptively 
disproportionate whenever it risks damage in any form to civilian.176 Supporters believe that this 
is not the case and that under a fair interpretation and application of IHL principle of 
proportionality; incidental injuries to civilians caused during attack are legal so long as the attack 
is proportional to a military gain.177 
 A threshold question that appears when discussing the armed conflict paradigm and 
whether IHL governs is whether the location of the planned targeted killing falls within the 
geographic scope of the conflict.178 In other words, is the potential targeted killing in the hotbed 
of the battlefield? The armed conflict with al Qaeda and its associated forces, can by definition, 
have no set geographical boundaries because al Qaeda is not territorially based due to how easily 
forces move across borders.179 According to the Stimson report, the military and CIA generally 
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work closely together when planning a targeted strike: few strikes are entirely military or entirely 
CIA.180 Because of different reporting requirements between the CIA and military this could create 
a risk of executive branch “forum shopping,” tempting the executive branch to place a given 
targeted strike under the direction and control whichever entity is deemed to have the most 
accommodating committee members.181 Some view that once conflict exists somewhere, IHL 
permits killing anywhere.182 Some scholars believe if the word battlefield is narrowly construed 
and limited killings to that of the battlefield than it would create a safe haven for terrorist in areas 
removed from active hostilities.183 Others believe that IHL restricts the use of force to areas of 
“substantial relationship” to the core conflict.184 Opponents of this view worry that this will create 
a boundary-less battlefield for nations seeking to target and kill opposing forces.  The US holds 
that lethal force may be used outside areas of active hostilities if there is a legal basis for using 
lethal force, target poses an imminent threat to U.S. persons, the proportionality standard is met, 
capture is not feasible, and the US will have respect for sovereignty and rules of armed conflict.185  
 Although the United States follows IHL rules when practicing targeting killings, some 
adversaries view the US targeted killing program as assassination. The practice of targeted killing 
by the US is not a recent development and has been a well-documented wartime strategy. In fact, 
evidence discovered by the U.S. Senate Select Committee chaired by Senator Frank Church 
reported in 1975 no less than eight plots involving CIA efforts to assassinate Cuban Dictator Fidel 
Castro.186 Church also reported assassination plots against President Ngo Dinh Diem of South 
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Vietnam and General Rene Schneider of Chile.187 During the Vietnam War, the Phoenix program 
was responsible for planning the assassinations of Viet Cong leaders and sympathizers.188 In 1986, 
President Ronald Reagan ordered the Operation El Dorado Canyon, which ordered U.S. jets to 
bomb Libyan locations where Colonel Muammar Qadhafi believed to be domiciled.189 According 
to Blum and Heymann, these assassination plots, “were taken to be an element of that part of 
foreign relations that always remains in the dark, outside official protocol or lawful interaction, 
unspoken of, but understood to be “part of the international game.””190  
Because of these assassination attempts by the US, President Reagan issued Executive 
Order No. 12,333, which prohibits U.S. officials from engaging in assassination.191 However, 
killing the enemy in wartime is legal. It is undisputed that assassination during peacetime 
conditions is illegal under international law; as any murder of a private individual and public figure 
for political purposes would be.192 This is not a practice that the United States is engaged in. The 
United States conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces is a non-international armed conflict 
authorized by the 2001 AUMF; which authorizes the president to use appropriate and necessary 
force against senior operational leaders and associate forces of al Qaeda.193 The US is not using 
targeted killings during times of peace but in times of war; which they are currently at with a non-
state actor. 
 Throughout the Bush administration, they relied on a December 1989 Memorandum of 
Law, issued by the Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to The Judge Advocate General of 
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the army at the time, W. Hays Parks.194 Parks asserted that the prohibition of assassinations did 
not preclude the use of targeted killing of enemy combatants in wartime or the killing in self-
defense of specific individuals who pose an imminent and direct threat to U.S. citizens or national 
security during peacetime.195 Parks stated that targeted killing was permissible under the inherent 
principal of self-defense to which every country is entitled to under Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter and customary international law.196 Article 51 allows countries to use force in 
self-defense after suffering armed attack such as the United States did after 9/11. 197  Former 
attorney general Reno warned President Clinton of the possible implications that might result if 
the assassination ban was relaxed on bin Laden; he warned of possible retaliation by the terror 
group.198 Because of the potential for retaliation and need for self-defense, Administration lawyers 
concluded that the ban would not be broken.199 Former Secretary of State Elihu Root affirmed that 
every state has the right to protect itself by preventing a conditions of affairs in which it will be 
too late to protect itself.200 The United States does not need to wait until al-Qaeda attacks before it 
can preemptively launch a strike to take out a terrorist camp or its leaders. Furthermore, Executive 
Order No. 12,333, implemented during the Reagan error, does not apply to the conflict between 
the U.S. and its enemies because they were done under different rationales. 
To sum up the legality portion, the US takes the position that during armed conflicts HRL 
gives way to IHL and its jus in bello principles. As long as the US follows the standards for the 
use of lethal force, provided there is a legal basis in IHL, the United States’ conduct is legal and 
just. Because the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with al Qaeda and associate 
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forces it is not considered assassination because the operatives are combatants and combatant are 
not precluded from being targeted and killed. Furthermore, combatants taking part in hostilities 
during armed conflict are subject to targeted killing because of the right of self-defense.   
V. Conclusion 
The United States targeted killing program is a legal, just, and effective tool. Targeted 
killing has been effective because many al Qaeda operatives, commanders and associate forces 
have been removed from the battle field. These combatants are no long able to reign terror by 
orchestrating plots to injured or kill the innocent. As Obama stated, “this is a just war—a war 
waged on proportionality, in the last resort, and in self-defense.201 The US is unable to win this 
war using traditional warfare like it has in the past. This is because of difficult terrain and because 
these terror groups aren’t geographically bound. To help overcome these obstacles the US has 
implemented the use of drones. The United States will not whimsically implement the use of drone 
strikes and will only use them when the preconditions of the law are met. As conveyed above the 
United States takes the view that IHL is the rule that governs during armed conflicts. As is the case 
in the non-international armed conflict the United States is currently engaged in with al Qaeda. 
During such armed conflict, lethal force may be used against combatants. 
Although targeted killing is legal, useful, and a tactic that the US relies on; it needs to be 
used carefully and the law needs to be refined internationally because of the international 
uncertainty and disagreement about the authoritative rule of law. The uncertainty of which law to 
apply could lead to chaos among the international community. This chaos could expand if other 
nations acted in a similar manner to the United States in terms of the lack of transparency. Although 
the US needs to act in secrecy before the attack they should set new precedent in which they 
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acknowledge the attack afterwards; creating more transparency on the international level. 
Furthermore, the United States needs develop international norms for the use of lethal force outside 
the traditional battlefield. As stated previous the United States has set precedent before on where 
and when it may use lethal force. Unfortunately, this war on has no end in sight and with the 
expansion of technology may only grow so these issues and controversies will continue to exist. It 
is important for the United States to spearhead and take steps necessary in creating a transparent 
and clear rule of law when conducting targeted killing. The United States needs to do this so other 
nations don’t undermined the rule of law in combatting enemies. Although the United States 
targeted killing program, that follows IHL, is a legal, just, and effective tool; it would best serve 
them and the international community to put forth a clearer and decided rule of law that is 
transparent. Although terror groups will not play by these rules it will allow the US and its allies 
to act in conformity and avoid unintended consequences.  
 
